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Auth: CS, USAF

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D/I, USAF ASSESSMENT OF MALIK STATEMENT

26 June 1951

Possible SE
on Truce

23 JUNE 1951

CONCLUSIONS

1. An examination of the Malik speech in the light of existing intelligence leads to the following conclusions:

a. The speech was an opportunistic exploitation of an appropriate occasion to reiterate the standard Soviet propaganda line, branding the Western powers as aggressors and disassociating the Soviet Union from the Korean war.

b. An obvious objective of the speech was to create dissension and disunity among the Western powers over the value of continued military operations in Korea, and to generate a false sense of security which would weaken the Western resolve to mobilize for defense.

c. In addition to the purely propaganda aspects of the speech, it probably reflects an actual desire to effect a disengagement in Korea for reasons of Soviet expediency and on terms and at a time advantageous to the Kremlin.

d. The speech may also serve as a cover for further Communist aggressions in Korea or elsewhere.

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☐ CIA has no objection to declass

☐ It contains information of CIA interest that must remain classified at TS S O

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☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

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DISCUSSION

2. On 23 June, the chief Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, made a statement on the UN radio broadcast, "The Price of Peace", which concluded with a suggestion that discussions be started between the belligerents in Korea for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel, as a first step for peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This suggestion, while no doubt authorized by the Kremlin, is not an official proposal and does not oblige the Soviet Union to pursue it actively to its conclusion, nor does it associate the Soviet Union with the Korean conflict in any way save as a "peace-maker".

3. The speech follows the current Soviet propaganda line and says nothing really new. The major portion of the speech was devoted to the usual denunciation of the West and to renewed insistence upon the inclusion of the Chinese Communist regime among the five great powers. However, favorable reference to the "peace" statement in Peiping broadcasts lends credence to it as something more than a pure propaganda move.

4. This convenient and timely use of the UN sounding board came on the eve of the first anniversary of the Korean conflict and immediately preceding an anticipated release of the announcement of a carefully planned UN peace proposal. It also closely followed the recent US Congressional passage of the Ken Amendment "putting teeth" in the embargo on shipment of war materials to the Soviet Union and its satellites, including Communist China.

X 5. An obvious propaganda objective of the speech is that of creating dissension among the Western powers as to the value of continued military operations in Korea. Another logical objective is the generation of an illusion of peace and a false sense of security, leading to the weakening of NATO, and of Western resolve to mobilize for defense. In addition, Malik's speech may be a cover for further Communist aggression in Korea or elsewhere.

6. Although the speech probably was intended primarily as a vehicle for the spreading of Soviet propaganda, it may reflect an actual desire for a cessation of hostilities, or a disengagement. The Soviet Union could have several valid reasons for wanting to bring the Korean campaign to a halt. Among those that might be to the Soviet advantage are:

a. To avoid the risk of general war implicit in more overt military assistance to Communist China.

b. To prevent the Korean war from spreading into a Chinese Communist-UN major war, which would imperil the Chinese Communist regime.

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- c. To terminate the costly Korean campaign, which has caused:
 - (1) devastation in N. Korea,
 - (2) a drain of every kind on China's marginal war potential,
 - (3) at least a limited logistical drain on the Soviet Union,
 - (4) obstruction to Communist expansion, particularly in Asia.
- d. Prevent the full implementation of Western economic measures directed against the Soviet system.
- e. To extricate their Chinese ally from futile pursuit of the Korean campaign or alternatively to permit a breathing spell for the regeneration and concentration of those forces, including the ever growing air threat.
- f. To permit consolidation of Communist control in China.
- g. To permit the development and deployment of the Chinese Communist capability toward other areas in Asia.
- h. To permit the regeneration of the North Korean military forces ahead of the South Korean forces.

7. Considerations which affect in some degree, at least, the above apparent advantages, include the following:

- a. Defensive preparations in the non-Communist world have already achieved considerable momentum and a Communist peace move in Korea after a year of sustained aggression might not be accepted as sufficient basis for a substantial relaxation of the anti-Communist defense program.
- b. Present attrition of UN forces in being would be suspended for the duration of the cease fire.
- c. Increments of UN military strength would be made available for bolstering the defenses of other areas on the Soviet periphery.
- d. A renewal of Communist aggression in Korea or elsewhere after a temporary cessation of Korean hostilities might, in the Soviet view, incur a greater risk of immediate global war than if the Korean hostilities were permitted to continue indefinitely.
- e. A soviet initiated cease fire might suggest Communist military weakness and cause a loss of Communist prestige that would not be fully offset by the Soviet role of "peace sponsor".

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f. If a possible permanent partition of Korea should result it might create a security threat to the Soviet Far East on the Asian mainland.

8. On balance, however, the possible advantages accruing to the Soviets as a result of a disengagement of Communist forces in Korea are believed to offset the risks the Soviets would incur, particularly since, in their present role, they apparently need not pursue any peace proposals if agreement is not reached on terms favorable to the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the Soviets will retain in large measure the initiative for local aggression elsewhere on their perimeter whether or not they effect a disengagement in Korea.

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